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We present a bit commitment protocol based on quantum nonlocality that seems to bring ever-
lasting unconditional security. Although security is not rigorously proved, physical arguments and
numerical simulations support this conclusion. The key point is that the proof of the commitment
is forced to become classical data uncorrelated with anything else. This allows us to circumvent
previous impossibility proofs in which it is assumed that classical data can be replaced by quantum
data that may be entangled with the committer. The proposed protocol also recovers two features
missing in recent “relativistic” quantum bit commitment protocols: (i) the committer can decide
if and when she wants to reveal the commitment and (ii) the security of the commitment lasts for
arbitrary long time.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Xa
Introduction.—Bit commitment (BC) constitutes the
building block of a wide range of cryptographic tasks,
including distant coin flipping [1], zero-knowledge proofs
[2], oblivious transfer [3], and secure multi-party compu-
tation [4]. The BC scenario involves two mutually mis-
trustful parties, Alice and Bob. Alice (the committer)
has to carry out an action that commits her to a partic-
ular bit value and provide a proof of this action to Bob
(the receiver). The purposes of a BC protocol are that,
once committed to a bit value, Alice cannot change it
(i.e., the protocol is binding) and Bob cannot learn any-
thing about it (i.e., the protocol is concealing) until and
if Alice decides to reveal it. A BC protocol is secure if it is
simultaneously binding and concealing, and it is uncon-
ditionally secure if it is secure against any cheater, either
Alice or Bob, even if they have unlimited computational
power.
A BC protocol has three phases. The commitment
phase, in which Alice and Bob communicate. At the end
of this phase, Alice should be committed to a bit value.
The holding phase, where Alice and Bob do not interact
for a while. In this phase, Bob may attempt to read
the commitment and Alice may try to prepare a cheat.
Finally, the revealing phase, that starts if and when Alice
decides to reveal her commitment, allowing Bob to check
its authenticity.
Unconditionally secure BC is impossible with classical
resources only. The classical BC protocols are based on
“one way” functions and on presumed limitations of the
computational power of Bob. In this Letter we propose
a protocol where quantum nonlocality provides such lim-
itation, suggesting unconditional security.
While quantum key distribution became a success
[5, 6], the question of whether quantum theory could
provide unconditionally secure BC has been always con-
troversial. Initial attempts to construct a quantum BC
protocol (see, e.g., [5, 7]) were finally discarded by the
impossibility proofs of Lo and Chau [8] and Mayers [9].
By taking advantage of the nonsignalling constraint
imposed by Minkowski space-time, Kent showed that it
is possible to guarantee security [10, 11]. The idea be-
hind these “relativistic protocols” is to split each party
into multiple agents that cannot communicate with each
other, at least in some steps of the protocol. The main
point is that, even if the agents collectively have enough
information to cheat, no single agent can cheat alone,
and thus the impossibility argument is avoided [12]. In
Ref. [10], Kent proposes a quantum BC protocol where
security is guaranteed by spacelike separation between
agents of each party. Later, Kent proposed another pro-
tocol [11] which requires less resources. These ideas have
recently been experimentally implemented [13, 14].
Despite the success of these so called “relativistic” pro-
tocols, one important restriction of these schemes is that
unconditional security is guaranteed only for a finite pe-
riod of time. A previous protocol that could last for
as long as the parties desire was also proposed by Kent
[15]. However, this protocol requires the parties to keep
communicating continuously in order to sustain the com-
mitment.
Here we address the question of whether quantum non-
locality, a single quantum resource that naturally in-
cludes both ingredients in a relativistic protocol (namely,
quantum measurements in a scenario in which commu-
nication is restricted by relativistic causality), can be
enough for unconditionally secure BC.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
7.
01
56
v3
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
8 D
ec
 20
13
2We present a protocol that is conjectured to give the
positive answer to this question. More interestingly, this
protocol allows us to identify which assumptions in pre-
vious “impossibility proofs” are not necessarily satisfied.
In a nutshell, the protocol introduced here is based on
the following ideas. During the commitment phase, Alice
(the committer) and Bob (the receiver) are close to each
other. Alice has one trusted agent and Bob has another
one. Both agents are close to each other and spacelike
separated from Alice and Bob. The proof of Alice’s com-
mitment is an element of a subset of the group Sn of
all permutations of n elements. The commitment phase
starts with this permutation applied to an entangled pure
state that Alice and her agent transfer to Bob and his
agent. Bob is forced to perform local measurements on
these particles. This makes the proof of the commit-
ment to become encoded at random classical data that
remains hidden by statistical security even when Bob and
his agent come together. It is this “classicalization” what
makes the protocol immune to Lo, Chau, and Mayers’
impossibility arguments [8, 9].
Security is provided by the fact that there does not
exist a local model capable of producing the correlations
that Bob and his agent observe and the only quantum
state capable of generating, for sure, such results is the
specific permutation applied by Alice to a set of max-
imally entangled bipartite states, thus preventing that
Alice and her agent can successfully cheat.
Fully nonlocal quantum correlations.—One important
ingredient in our protocol is the existence of bipartite
Bell inequalities in which the maximum quantum me-
chanical violation equals the algebraic bound. Reaching
this bound requires perfect correlations between all the
measurements [16, 17].
To introduce these quantum correlations, called fully
nonlocal [16], consider two spatially separated parties
that we call Bob and Bob’s agent. Each of them can
choose randomly one out of three experiments to per-
form: B0, B1, B2 for Bob, and b0, b1, b2 for Bob’s agent.
Each experiment has four possible outcomes, denoted
++, +−, −+, and −−.
For this scenario, we can write the expression
β = 〈B(10)0 b(10)0 〉+ 〈B(01)0 b(10)1 〉+ 〈B(11)0 b(10)2 〉
+〈B(10)1 b(01)0 〉+ 〈B(01)1 b(01)1 〉+ 〈B(11)1 b(01)2 〉 (1)
+〈B(10)2 b(11)0 〉+ 〈B(01)2 b(11)1 〉 − 〈B(11)2 b(11)2 〉,
where 〈B(10)1 b(01)0 〉 is the mean value of the product of
the first bit of the result of measuring B1 by the second
bit of the result of b0, 〈B(01)2 b(11)1 〉 is the mean value of
the product of the second bit of the result of measuring
B2 by the first and second bits of the result of b1, and
analogously for the other terms.
This expression has the following property:
β
LHV≤ 7 NS≤ 9, (2)
where
LHV≤ 7 indicates that, for any local hidden vari-
able theory, β is upper bounded by 7 and
NS≤ 9 indicates
that, for any theory satisfying nonsignalling, β is upper
bounded by 9. The interesting point is that, with a par-
ticular choice of quantum state and measurements, it is
possible to reach the maximum value β = 9 [17].
For the particular local observables that we will use
in the protocol (see [18]), β reaches the value 9 for the
quantum state |ξ〉 given by
|ξ〉 = ∣∣Φ+〉
12
⊗ ∣∣Φ+〉
34
, (3a)
where |Φ+〉 is the following two-qubit maximally entan-
gled state: ∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) . (3b)
Subindexes 12 and 34 remind us that Bob holds qubits 1
and 3, while Bob’s agent holds qubits 2 and 4.
The condition β = 9 implies that each term in β has
to be equal to −1 or +1, depending on the sign with
which the corresponding mean value appears in β. This
means that, for any measurements Bob and his agent
choose to perform, they obtain a perfectly correlated pair
of bits. For example, for maximizing β the condition
〈B(01)0 b(10)1 〉 = 1 has to be satisfied. This implies that,
if Bob measures B0 and his agent measures b1, then the
second bit of Bob’s outcome has to be equal to the first
bit of Bob’s agent’s outcome. For clarity, Table I illus-
trates all Bob’s agent’s possible results for the case Bob
had chosen to measure B0. Analogous relations occur for
Bob’s other choices of measurements.
|ξ〉
B0 b0 b1 b2
++ ++,+− ++,+− ++,+−
+− ++,+− −+,−− −+,−−
−+ −+,−− +−,++ −+,−−
−− −+,−− −+,−− ++,+−
TABLE I: The first column of the table shows the possible re-
sults Bob can obtain when the measurement B0 is performed.
The next three columns show Bob’s agent’s possible results if
they share the state |ξ〉.
The protocol.—Now we make use of the previously de-
scribed Bell inequality to introduce the proposed BC pro-
tocol. It goes as follows (see Fig. 1):
1. We assume that Alice and her agent share n pairs
of particles (ququarts or pairs of qubits) in the en-
tangled state |ξ〉, and that Alice and Bob agree on
an inertial reference frame and two spacelike sep-
arated points of space-time, x1 and x2, where the
commitment will be made.
32. The commitment phase starts with Alice meeting
Bob at point x1, while Alice’s agent meets Bob’s
agent at point x2.
3. Alice’s agent is supposed to send the particles to
Bob’s agent in the same order they were previously
arranged, while Alice, who is the responsible for
making the commitment, chooses one permutation
among a subset An,r of the set Sn of permutations
of n elements, and changes the order of the parti-
cles accordingly before sending them to Bob. The
permutation chosen by Alice will be the proof of
her commitment.
4. For each ququart Bob receives, he is supposed
to choose one among three four-outcome measure-
ments to perform, B0, B1, and B2. Analogously
Bob’s agent chooses among b0, b1, and b2 to per-
form.
5. Each time Bob receives one ququart, he has to in-
form Alice back which was the obtained outcome.
In order to certify that Bob is really performing
the local measurements on his system, Alice shall
randomly insert, among the n ququarts described
above, some particles in pure states known to her
and which generate definite answer for some Bj .
Then, for each check particle, after Bob informs
Alice the outcome she asks him about the mea-
surement performed. It is sufficient to introduce
this check between Alice and Bob: Alice’s agent
will just deliver the particles to Bob’s agent, who
will not provide her with any information. This is
the end of the commitment phase.
6. After the commitment, during the holding phase,
Alice and Bob as well as their agents can split and
do whatever possible with their systems.
7. In the revealing phase, which happens when and if
Alice decides to, she reveals to Bob which was the
sent permutation.
8. Bob can check with his agent if the unveiled permu-
tation maximally violate the Bell inequality, certi-
fying Alice’s commitment.
The encoding alphabet.—Another main point in our
protocol is the use of permutations to encode the bit
value.
By construction of the protocol, whenever a permuta-
tion fix a system, the (anti-)correlation will be perfect;
otherwise, the results are independent. This suggests the
following choice of alphabet: Let An,r ⊂ Sn be a maximal
random set formed by permutations that obeys:
σi, σj ∈ An,r ⇒ d (σi, σj) ≥ r, ∀ i 6= j, (4)
FIG. 1: Illustration of the protocol for the case n = 4, when
Alice commits to the permutation σA = 4132 and sends one
particle to certify Bob’s local measurements. The commit-
ment is made in the dashed regions around the spacelike sep-
arated points x1 and x2. The space-time point Q represents
the end of space-like separation between Bob and his agent.
From there, they can attack collectively the proof of commit-
ment, trying to discover Alice’s choice.
where 1 < r ≤ n, and d(·, ·) represents the Hamming
distance (number of permuted positions) between two
permutations. Therefore, all the possible permutations
Alice can choose in the protocol differ from each other
by at least r positions.
The association of each permutation to a bit value is
made by the use of a suitably chosen function that uni-
formly distributes the bit values 0 and 1 over the elements
of random subsets of the set An,r. Parity seems to be a
good choice.
Security against Alice.—The maximal violation of the
Bell inequality assures that Alice must have been hon-
est in the state sent during the commitment phase, since
|ξ〉 is the only state that maximally violates the Bell in-
equality β ≤ 7, and therefore the only state capable of
generating for sure consistent results.
Another possible cheat is that Alice can reveal a wrong
permutation. However, since our alphabet is restricted to
An,r, the best she can do is to try to reveal a permutation
that is r positions distant from the original one, which
gives her a probability of success bounded by 2−r.
The protocol does not prevent Alice from committing
to a superposition of bits, but her probabilities of reveal-
ing 0 or 1 are fixed during the commitment phase and
then it is considered fair [19] (in order to describe the
procedure of committing to a superposition we need a
more subtle formalism that is out of the scope of this
Letter and will be discussed elsewhere, for more discus-
sion about the coherent commitment, see [18]).
Security against Bob.—Bob has no way to cheat while
he is spacelike separated from his agent. Since Alice’s
4verification in the commitment phase forces Bob to per-
form the local measurements, after Bob and his agent
come together, they still have a very small probability
of finding out the commitment, given the large number
of permutations consistent with the recorded data. Since
the alphabet An,r is huge (a very simple estimation shows
#An,r >
2n!
rnr
), the number of permutations consistent
with Bob’s data is very large (e.g.: for n = 100, r = 60
the number is above a million). In the Supplementary
Material [18] we discuss in more detail some estimations
and numerical results. However, the delicate point is
to guarantee that Bob cannot distinguish the original
permutation among the set of consistent permutations.
That is, the set of consistent permutations has to have
(almost) no structure. Our numerical simulations sup-
port that concealing can be reached by suitable choices
of n and r, but this is still an open point [18].
Quantum state.—In order to show that it is enough
to check that Bob performs the local measurements, we
analyse the quantum state of the system after the com-
mitment phase, considering that Alice and Bob played
their part, but that Bob’s agent can keep his particles
for future use.
Denote by Mj,o the measurement operator acting on
both systems when Bob measures Bj and obtains the
outcome o, i.e., M0,++ = |00〉 〈00| ⊗ I, . . . ,M2,−− =
|ω−〉 〈ω−|⊗I, with the pure states’ choice, |00〉 , . . . , |ω−〉,
detailed in Supplementary Material [18]. It is important
to recognize that Mj,o |ξ〉 is a pure product state, |ψj,o〉,
which depends on j and o. The quantum state of the
hole system of n ququarts (discarding the check particles
introduced by Alice) after step 5 of the protocol is∣∣∣ΨσA(jk),(ok)〉 = ∏
k
M
(σ−1A (k))
jk,ok
|ξ〉⊗n , (5)
where (ok) is the sequence of outcomes obtained when
Bob measured the sequence of observables (Bjk) on his
particles in the state obtained after Alice applied the per-
mutation σA to |ξ〉⊗n.
The most important point is that such quantum state
strongly depends on σA, (jk), and (ok), where the first
is unknown to Bob (to make the protocol concealing)
and the second is unknown to Alice (to make it bind-
ing), while the third is public. The best description of
the global quantum state, available to Bob’s agent while
space-separated from Bob and Alice is given by
ρb =
∑
σ∈An,r
∑
(jk)
∑
(ok)
p (σ, (jk) , (ok))
∣∣∣Ψσ(jk),(ok)〉〈Ψσ(jk),(ok)∣∣∣ ,
(6a)
where p (σ, (jk) , (ok)) denotes this joint probability. In
case the protocol is followed this will be
p (σ, (jk) , (ok)) =
1
#An,r
1
3n
1
4n
. (6b)
On the other hand, Bob knows (jk) and (ok), which
makes his best description of the state be
ρB(jk),(ok) =
∑
σ∈An,r
p (σ)
∣∣∣Ψσ(jk),(ok)〉〈Ψσ(jk),(ok)∣∣∣ . (6c)
This is also the description after Bob and his agent meet.
The von Neumann entropy of these states is generi-
cally very high. In case (jk) is a typical sequence, the
scalar product
∣∣∣〈Ψσ(jk),(ok)∣∣∣Ψσ′(jk),(ok)〉∣∣∣ is upper-bounded
by a decreasing function of the Hamming distance be-
tween the two permutations. The choice of An,r has im-
pact also here. Even more important than this, a state
discrimination attack aiming to learn about the permuta-
tion is also very ineffective when large n is used, since all
permutations which fix equal measurement settings and
results will originate the same quantum state; in other
words, the same quantum state for Bob’s agent system
will be obtained for many different allowed permutations.
Finally, we could consider what Alice knows about such
state. Since she is not aware of (jk), she must describe
the system by
ρAσ,(ok) =
∑
(jk)
p ((jk))
∣∣∣Ψσ(jk),(ok)〉〈Ψσ(jk),(ok)∣∣∣ , (6d)
which has, again, very high entropy.
On the nonapplicability of the impossibility proofs.—
There are two impossibility proofs of unconditionally se-
cure BC: the “classical” proof, that shows that it is im-
possible using classical data, and the Lo-Chau-Mayers
proof, that shows that it is also impossible with the help
of quantum states. Here we explain how our protocol
evades both.
The Lo-Chau-Mayers proof assumes that the proof of
Alice’s commitment that is delivered to Bob can always
be replaced by a quantum state, nondiscriminable by
Bob, which may possibly be only a part of an entan-
gled state with the other part kept by Alice. This allows
her to later purify and cheat. A key point in our protocol
is to make this impossible. At step 5, Alice’s part of the
quantum state is destroyed and forced to produce classi-
cal data that cannot be correlated with Alice (otherwise
the Bell inequality would not be maximally violated).
This “classicalization” at step 5 certifies that Bob
is performing local measurements (instead of collecting
quantum states), without giving Alice enough informa-
tion that she could use to cheat. Alice needs to be sure
that the quantum state was destroyed by Bob’s measure-
ment. At the same time, Bob needs to be sure that Al-
ice is not keeping correlated systems that allow her to
change the commitment without being discovered. Using
a completely quantum description: At first, the quantum
state factors between Bob and his agent and the rest of
the world (since Bob and his agent share an entangled
pure state). Then, as Bob is forced to measure, Bob also
5factors out from his agent, and the final quantum state
(alone) does not hold enough information to discriminate
among many possible permutations equally distributed
between the two possible bit values.
After step 5, the data is classical. Why then the clas-
sical impossibility argument does not apply? The reason
is because each pair of outcomes is perfectly correlated
and, together, violate a Bell inequality up to its algebraic
maximum. Therefore, no classical (local) model can ac-
count for the correlations observed by Bob and his agent.
This means that the data where the permutation is en-
coded after step 5 is unavailable to Alice (given that Bob
avoid any leak), since it was not available prior to Bob’s
measurements.
This shows that nonlocality and the “classicalization”
at step 5 are essential ingredients to escape from previ-
ous arguments against the possibility of an uncondition-
ally secure BC and that quantum theory can provide a
natural “one way function” that limitates Bob’s power to
extract the encoded permutation from the available data
which serves to confirm authenticity.
Conclusions.—We have presented a BC protocol based
on quantum nonlocality which bypass the two strongest
objections against unconditionally secure BC. By im-
posing a “classicalization” procedure (namely, measure-
ment), we can take benefit from the best of two worlds:
data cannot be copied nor hidden since it was generated
by quantum randomness, and the proof of the commit-
ment cannot be purified, since it is already encoded in
classical form. Even in the absence of a complete proof
of security, a virtue of the protocol presented here is to
identify an assumption in Lo-Chau-Mayers proofs of im-
possibility of unconditionally secure BC that is not nec-
essarily satisfied.
In addition, the protocol presented here has the fol-
lowing advantages over relativistic protocols [10, 11]: It
requires less agents than Ref. [11], it does not need
the transmission of classical or quantum information at
nearly the speed of light [10], it does not need to sustain
communication during all the phases of the protocol, and,
more importantly, the security is not limited to a brief
amount of time.
We still cannot claim that our protocol solves the prob-
lem of unconditionally secure BC, since we do not have
a complete proof of security. We only have a proof of
security against a specific list of attacks which include
some attacks that break previous protocols (see [18] for
more details). Moreover, our proof is based on a con-
jecture that is only supported by numerical evidence,
namely, that concealing is guaranteed by the (conjec-
tured) impossibility of distinguishing the “right” permu-
tation among the many permutations consistent with the
randomly generated data, even when Bob and his agent
come together (see [18] for more details). However, the
observation that there is a way to bypass the two stan-
dard objections against unconditionally secure BC opens
new perspectives and shows that we can be, for the sec-
ond time [6], in a situation where quantum nonlocality
paves the way for a paradigmatic cryptographic task.
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Here we detail the observables that lead to the maximal violation of the Bell inequality used in the
protocol for bit commitment presented in Ref. [1] and discuss the security of this protocol against
some specific attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud,03.67.Dd,42.50.Xa
The notation used is the one introduced in Ref. [1].
Optimal observables.—The observables that lead to the
maximal violation of inequality β for the state |ξ〉 are the
following:
B0 =r++ |00〉〈00|+ r+− |01〉〈01| (1a)
+ r−+ |10〉〈10|+ r−− |11〉〈11| ,
B1 =r++ |++〉〈++|+ r+− |−+〉〈−+| (1b)
+ r−+ |+−〉〈+−|+ r−− |−−〉〈−−| ,
B2 =r++
∣∣χ+〉〈χ+∣∣+ r+− ∣∣χ−〉〈χ−∣∣ (1c)
+ r−+
∣∣ω+〉〈ω+∣∣+ r−− ∣∣ω−〉〈ω−∣∣ ,
where
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) , (2a)∣∣χ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0+〉 ± |1−〉) , (2b)∣∣ω±〉 = 1√
2
(|1+〉 ± |0−〉) . (2c)
While:
b0 =r++ |0+〉〈0+|+ r+− |0−〉〈0−| (3a)
+ r−+ |1+〉〈1+|+ r−− |1−〉〈1−| ,
b1 =r++ |+0〉〈+0|+ r+− |−0〉〈−0| (3b)
+ r−+ |+1〉〈+1|+ r−− |−1〉〈−1| ,
b2 =r++
∣∣φ+〉〈φ+∣∣+ r+− ∣∣φ−〉〈φ−∣∣ (3c)
+ r−+
∣∣ψ+〉〈ψ+∣∣+ r−− ∣∣ψ−〉〈ψ−∣∣ ,
where ∣∣φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) , (4a)∣∣ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) . (4b)
Security against Bob’s attacks.—We now present some
estimations in order to discuss Bob’s possibilities of dis-
covering Alice’s commitment.
First, by considering a sphere packing’s point of view,
we made some estimations of the cardinality of the al-
phabet An,r and the set of permutations consistent with
Bob’s results.
Let Bn,r˜ be a ball of radius r˜ in the set Sn (i.e., a set
of permutations at a distance at most r˜ from some given
permutation). The cardinality of Bn,r˜ is given by
#Bn,r˜ =
r˜∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
Ck, (5a)
where Ck is the number of chaotic permutations of k
elements, i.e., permutations that do not fix any element:
Ck = k!
k∑
j=0
(−1)j
j!
. (5b)
Then,
#Bn,r˜ =
r˜∑
k=0
n!
(n− k)!
 k∑
j=0
(−1)j
j!
 . (5c)
We can upper bound the cardinality of An,r by
#An,r ≤ #Sn
#Bn,b r−12 c
, (6a)
where b•c is the integer floor of • , i.e., the smaller integer
greater than or equal to • . Then,
#An,r ≤ 1∑b r−12 c
k=0
1
(n−k)!
[∑k
j=0
(−1)j
j!
] . (6b)
Using this approximation, we can associate a density
to the set An,r:
%n,r =
#An,r
n!
≤ 1
#Bn,b r−12 c
. (7)
Now we can estimate the number of elements in An,r
at distance r˜ from a fixed permutation σA:
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2# {σ ∈ An,r , d(σ, σA) = r˜} = [#Bn,r˜ −#Bn,r˜−1]× %n,r ≤ 3n
r˜
2
⌊
r−3
2
⌋
(n− 1)2 . (8)
Analogously, we can obtain lower bounds to the cardi-
nality of the set An,r:
#An,r ≥ #Sn
#Bn,r
, (9a)
that leads to
%n,r ≥ 1
#Bn,r
. (9b)
This allows us to estimate:
# {σ ∈ An,r , d(σ, σA) = r˜} ≥ (n− r˜ + 1)
r˜−r
3r
. (10)
The number of permutations at distance r˜ from a fixed
permutation, σA, increases with r˜.
The important question to be answered is whether the
set Bobn,r of consistent permutations with Bob and his
agent’s results has some structure that allows to highlight
the permutation chosen by Alice.
From Bob’s perspective, and assuming that he and his
agent had already performed the required measurements,
the only remaining attack is to try to obtain, fromBobn,r,
the distinguished permutation σA.
To discard this possibility, we have to consider the
Hamming distance between the elements of Bobn,r. More
formally: Let σA be the permutation Alice has chosen to
encode her commitment and consider σC another permu-
tation consistent with Bob and his agent’s results, such
that d(σC , σA) = C. The question to be answered is the
following:
〈# {σ ∈ Bobn,r , d(σ, σC) = r˜}〉 ?= 〈# {σ ∈ Bobn,r , d(σ, σA) = r˜}〉, ∀ r˜, (11)
where 〈. . . 〉 denotes the expected value of the random variable.
To answer this question, we simulated the sets Bobn,r
for some small values of n and r. For each consistent per-
mutation σ, we calculated the number of permutations
in Bobn,r distant from σ by r˜ positions, for r ≤ r˜ ≤ n.
We simulated Bobn,r one thousand times for the case
n = 10, r = 6. The average cardinality of the set Bobn,r
is about 8 elements, and even for these small numbers
the results obtained look good. In some cases, the most
highlighted permutation (meaning the one that has the
greatest number of first neighbors) is not the one which
Alice is committed to, sometimes we have more than one
highlighted permutation, and on average just in 10% of
the cases there was just one highlighted permutation and
it was the one chosen by Alice (i.e., Bob would succeed
in cheating).
With these numerical results for very small values of n
and r, we strongly believe that using larger values we can
make the protocol as statistically secure as demanded.
Security against Alice’s using quantum
superpositions.—In a quantum bit commitment pro-
tocol, Alice has the possibility of using a quantum
superposition of commitments. Here we discuss what
happens in our protocol when Alice uses a superposition
of permutations.
When we talk about a specific permutation of n sys-
tems of maximally entangled ququarts, the Hilbert space
associated with the whole system is well defined. We can
write
H = (C4I ⊗ C4II)⊗n , (12)
where I represents the systems that later will be given
to Bob and II the systems that will be given to Bob’s
agent. Here we get a natural order associated with the
systems
H = (C4I ⊗ C4II)1 ⊗ (C4I ⊗ C4II)2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ (C4I ⊗ C4II)n .
(13)
Then, by applying a permutation to one of the parties, it
can be written as σI⊗III , where σI permutes the systems
I.
One way of “committing to a superposition” is to take
two distinct permutations σ and pi, promote them to
operators acting on H as σI ⊗ III and piI ⊗ III , and
then superposing like (cσσI + cpipiI) ⊗ III . Such “non-
commitment”, however, presents no advantage for Alice,
since the resulting quantum state would generate results
that may not be consistent with any of these two permu-
tations.
3In the same way, the trick of introducing some ancilla
and entangle it with the system by associating different
permutation operators to different states of the ancilla
will not help, since Alice would not have control on the
ancilla’s result, so this case corresponds to commit to
a mixture. Such strategy is allowed in bit commitment
discussions (and actually cannot be avoided in quantum
protocols) since the sum of the probability of successfully
unveil 0 plus the probability of successfully unveil 1 is
not greater than 1 + , where  can be made arbitrarily
small [2].
The totally quantum description.— As discribed in
Ref. [1], the quantum state of the hole system of n
ququarts (discarding the check particles introduced by
Alice) after step 5 of the protocol is∣∣∣ΨσA(jk),(ok)〉 = ∏
k
M
(σ−1A (k))
jk,ok
|ξ〉⊗n . (14)
One can now include in such description a register for Al-
ice and a register for Bob’s measurements and outcomes,
which would generate the complete description∣∣∣ΦσA(jk),(ok)〉 = |σA〉 |(jk)〉 |(ok)〉 ∣∣∣ΨσA(jk),(ok)〉 , (15)
where the first register belongs to Alice, second and third
to Bob, and the last part is pure product state shared by
Bob and his agent, with no participation of Alice’s agent,
who has aquired no information during the process.
Such all quantum description helps in two different as-
pects: one is to recognize, once again, that Lo-Chau-
Mayers’s argument does not apply, since Alice’s register
is factored from rest of the system. The other is related
to commiting to a superposition. Now we would have∣∣∣Φ|ψ〉(jk),(ok)〉 = α |σ〉 |(jk)〉 |(ok)〉 ∣∣∣Ψσ(jk),(ok)〉 (16)
+β |pi〉 |(jk)〉 |(ok)〉
∣∣∣Ψpi(jk),(ok)〉 ,
which is an entangled state of Alice’s register consistent
with either permutation σ or pi and Bob’s agent state
capable of generating data consistent with a proof of the
respective permutation. In this case, we can say that
Alice resign her right of choosing, but the protocol still
works afterwards, in the sense the that Alice’s register
for the permutation will read a permutation consistent
with the maximal violation of the Bell inequality.
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